Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

the system of staffing, optimization of the system of military
education, improvement of the system of mobilization planning
and other measures. 37
Serdyukov’s letter also promised that the defense
ministry planned to involve SVOP experts in future
development and modernization of the Russian military
in the broader, “consultative interaction within
the framework of the activities of the Public Council
of the Russian Federation defense ministry.” 38 In
April 2010, while attempting to explain why the defense
ministry had suspended its plans to introduce a
military police structure, Serdyukov interestingly said
that additional time was required to “study foreign
experience.” 39
It is important to emphasize, however, that there
was and is no Russian effort to copy western experience.
Although this analysis is playing a formative
role in the current reform, it is highly unlikely that the
Russian armed forces will ever simply become a copy
of any western model. Although the report cannot be
seen as representing sole justification for aspects of the
reform concept, it is nevertheless possible to discern
many of its features and identify both the strength and
weakness of the new look. For many western observers,
the conceptual approach involved in Serdyukov’s
reform makes sense precisely because it does draw
upon western experience. As the reform concept was
applied, the defense ministry and General Staff discovered
weaknesses or unforeseen problems requiring
correction or revision to the original concept.
Absent from the original declaratory concept, for instance,
was the intention recently outlined by the General
Staff, to replace the existing six military districts
with four enlarged operational-strategic commands
(by December 1, 2010).
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