Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

whose creation in Russia progresses at a pace which
requires considerable acceleration. And the situation
with information transferability is far from the ideal
altogether, given our mind-boggling diversity of automated
systems and means of data transfer which were
designed using different fundamental, design, and
software principles. 34
Resolving such issues and making appropriate
refinements where needed also, as Burenok stressed,
has implications for force structure and development.
Thus, while the “new look” is marked by its switch
from the system it displaced, it is not yet in its final
form: it will continue to change in response to the demands
of network-centric warfare models and how
this is achieved practically and in a way that suits Russian
requirements.
Reconceptualization.
Considering the overall conceptual basis of
Serdyukov’s reform revolving around restructuring
and focusing on permanent readiness brigades with
enhanced combat capability and combat readiness, it
is worth tracing the formative intellectual influences
that led to adopting and planning the new look. Of
course, brigades were not “new” as such in the Russian
military experience. They were, after all, actively
utilized in mechanized formations during the Great
Patriotic War, and, more recently, Soviet and Russian
defense ministers had certainly toyed with the idea
of either enhancing the number of brigades or even
transitioning more fully to a brigade-based system. In
October 1990, Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov signed
a draft reform program envisaging such a transition,
Pavel Grachev later planned to increase the number
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