Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Institute, examined some of these inconsistencies.
Noting that the model of network-centric warfare is
formed of three grids (sensor, information, and combat)
he then demonstrated the way that many theorists
over-simplify the issues. 31
He noted that some Russian military scientists attempt
to prove that adopting network-centric warfare
requires no changes to the plans to develop the armed
forces and their weapons systems or combat manuals
and instructions. Others argue precisely the opposite,
and recommend procuring next generation armaments
as well as mass-produced network-centric robotic
technologies that are not even available in western
armies. Burenok succinctly encapsulated the sheer
complexity in forming armed forces oriented towards
network-centric operations, since it entails seeking
a synergy between human and technologically advanced
factors. Yet, some theorists persist, in his view,
in claiming that progress can be achieved by making a
massive and sudden jump to introduce such new concepts
and technology. He concludes that if there is no
real understanding of how this type of war should be
fought, then it is impossible to verbalize and formulate
algorithms for conducting network-centric wars.
The scientific understanding must precede software
development and procurement decisions. 32
After the transition to the new model of the armed
forces, we have found ourselves at the beginning of
the journey, because both the structure and the composition
of the military formations have changed
considerably (and continue to change). 33 And what
about information compatibility? It begins with the
unified information space (standard classifications,
vocabularies and databases of models, their tactical
and technical performance characteristics and so on),
46