Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

procurement (estimates within the Russian defense
industry suggest that there is capacity to transfer five
brigades per annum to automated C 3 systems) but also
raises important defense planning issues. 29 If networkcentric
warfare capabilities are the central aim of the
reform, has this been adequately factored into current
procurement plans? In other words is the state prioritizing
the correct equipment and weapons systems?
Officers receiving additional training during 2010 on
how to issue orders using such automated technology
reported that the software is overly complicated and
the icons and other aspects of the systems need to be
simplified. If officers are experiencing such user issues
it raises fundamental questions about the end-user being
a 12-month conscript. This seems to be more than
mere teething issues. 30
An additional, deeper, and more complex problem,
or rather set of problems, relates to the division, disagreement,
and misunderstanding that currently exists
on how simple or complex these challenges really
are and what it means for force structure and training.
Reading Russian writers on network-centric warfare,
it is quite striking how advanced and sophisticated
their knowledge can be, revealing deep understanding
of these developments in the U.S. and Chinese
armed forces in particular. However, there are gaps
and a lack of fully agreed approaches to overcoming
such issues, which may well serve to complicate planning
decisions. Here the risk is, to paraphrase the former
Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin,
“we wanted the best, and ended up with what usually
happens.” In a recent article in Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye assessing the contours of this debate,
Major-General Vasiliy Burenok, the Director of the
Defense Ministry’s 46th Research and Development
45