Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

has not been followed by any obvious solution. There
is disagreement over the length of conscript service,
or, faced with a dwindling conscript pool, whether to
increase the maximum age for service from 27 years of
age to 30.
Much has been made of extensive planning to
introduce a new professional non-commissioned officer
(NCO), with the first of these being trained in a
new NCO training center at the elite Ryazan airborne
school. The Commander of the VDV, Lieutenant-
General Vladimir Shamanov, was specifically tasked
with inculcating the “spirit” of the VDV among these
new NCOs. All were required to make parachute
jumps and were meticulously trained in a course lasting
2 years and 10 months. Yet, despite the shortage
of entrants to the center (it opened in December 2009
with under 260 students), there are also contradictory
statements concerning the underlying NCO concept:
will these NCOs in the future take on the burden of
commanding their units, and will their commanding
officers come to terms with delegating authority?
Addressing the defense ministry collegium on March
5, 2010, President Medvedev said such NCOs in the
future may take on command roles, which does not
help to clarify their actual role. Medvedev stated that:
“NCOs should be capable, if required, to substitute for
officers of the primary level.” 25
Another critical factor in measuring the success
of Serdyukov’s reform will be the transformation of
the officer corps. Yet, there is also no clear consensus
on what model officer Russian defense planners
have in mind, nor has there been any planning for
how to achieve this. Instead, there are loosely framed
aspirations calling for better types of officers. Reportedly,
corruption persists within the officer corps. If
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