Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

formed conventional forces might achieve s viable deterrence
in case of attack from a modernized Chinese
military. In the absence of such a capability, Russia
will be forced to gamble even more on theater nuclear
forces and be even less willing to consider reductions
in its nonstrategic nuclear forces. In the context of an
increasing military confrontation on the Korean peninsula
and periodic tensions between Washington and
Beijing over Taiwan, Russia’s new posture adds one
further complication to Eurasian security for all parties
and makes Asian nuclear force reductions an even
more complex problem for Washington to manage.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 10
1. This chapter draws heavily upon research done for the paper,
“Asian Drivers of Russia’s Nuclear Force Posture,” which
will be published shortly by the Nonproliferation Education Center
of Washington, DC. The author wishes to express his appreciation
to Henry Sokolski, who provided invaluable comments and
suggestions on that paper.
2. Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia,
Russia, and the Future of the West, New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2010.
3. The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington,
DC: White House, May 27, 2010, p. 3, available from www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
4. Ibid., p. 44.
5. The obvious exception to this view is Zbigniew Brzezinski.
His book, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic
Imperatives, reflected the assumptions of its time, which assumed
America’s status as a superpower in a unipolar landscape,
where the United States could forge arrangements with other
regional powers. Brzezinski forecast China’s sphere of influence
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