Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

cruiser Petr Velikii to observe a mock naval battle and
amphibious landing, naval officers there informed the
media that the tactical problem of the exercise was the
destruction of “an American squadron” and that the
probable enemy was unchanged. Commenting on the
meteorological conditions at the time of this naval exercise,
which involved heavy mist and low visibility,
the author described Vostok-2010 as “covered in fog,”
a categorization which would fit the confused military
and political signals being sent. 65 Finally, the air and
ground exercises near Chita and Khabarovsk make
no sense except as responses to some force threatening
the territorial integrity of Eastern Siberia and the
Far East. The only forces with the military potential to
carryout air and ground attacks that deep into Russian
territory are the PLA in support of the so-called
separatists identified in the scenario. Reflecting on
the vignettes that made up Vostok-2010, Aleskandr’
Khramchikhin concluded that the hypothetical opponent
in these ground and air operations was, indeed,
Russia’s probable opponent, the PLA. And he stated
in his assessment of the exercise that: “The probable
opponent will defeat us in a serious conflict.” 66
The one branch of the Russian military not involved
in direct combat operations during Vostok-2010 was
the Strategic Rocket Forces, which carried out no operational
launches. Their only role was the defense of
their bases from attacks by terrorists. However, according
to press reports, the exercise did end with a
tactical nuclear strike. As Khramchikhin noted, such
a strike was hardly in keeping with a fight against
separatists and bandits. 67 This seems to suggest that
conventional forces could not handle such a challenge
to the territorial integrity of the Russian state in so
vulnerable a region as the Far East. However, the sce-
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