Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

structures, early warning systems, national command
and control, and nuclear weapons systems, which fits
a U.S.-led NATO threat involving conventional forces
cable of conducting global strikes against such targets;
and 2) during an invasion by an enemy’s ground units
onto Russian territory if Russia’s Armed Forces are
incapable of stopping the enemy progress and it penetrates
deep into the country through conventional
means of waging war, which fits more closely with an
assault by the PLA against the Russian Far East. 32
The first concept resembles one popularized by
General-Major Vladimir Slipchenko in his discussions
of sixth-generation warfare and no-contact warfare on
the model of NATO’s campaign against Kosovo, but
applied on a global scale. 33 Slipchenko speculated on
the use of long-range precision-strike systems for attacks
upon enemy economic, administrative, and military
infrastructure. The second concept, which was not
contained in the 2000 version of Russian Military Doctrine
is quite new and reflects what the Russian military
recognizes is an emerging threat from the PRC.
In a polemic with Slipchenko in 2005, General Gareev
discussed such a conflict which would require the
development of a mass mobilization base to conduct
a protracted war, which employed precision-strike
systems, but did not achieve annihilation of the opponent’s
forces. 34 Both Slipchenko and Gareev agreed
that nuclear deterrence had become self-deterrence in
the post-Cold War era.
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