Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

56. An argument in favor of a multi-causal explanation for
Cold War and post-Cold War outcomes in nuclear policy and
strategy is effectively presented in Michael Krepon, Better Safe
than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2009.
57. In addition to sources previously cited, excellent discussions
on this topic appear in Alexei Arbatov, “Terms of Engagement:
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and U.S.-
Russian Relations,” Chap. 5, pp. 139-168; and Stephen J. Blank,
“Prospects for Russo-American Cooperation in Halting Nuclear
Proliferation,” Chap. 6, pp. 169-284, both in Stephen J. Blank, ed.,
Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation, Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009.
58. Although official U.S. policy holds that Iran should not
be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, the United States also
hedges against the possibility of a nuclear Iran, including plans
for missile detection and defense systems and other military ties
to Persian Gulf states and Obama’s revised missile defense plan
for Europe. See “U.S. Considers Options Against Nuclear Iran,”
Associated Press, April 23, 2010, available from www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2010/04/20/politics/main6414377.shtml.
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