Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

The findings in Figure 9-6 show that within a threetiered
constrained nuclear proliferation system, under
an umbrella of U.S. and Russian forces each capped
at 1,000 deployed long-range weapons, it is possible
(although not guaranteed) to construct a deterrence
and crisis-stable pyramid if—always the big “if”—negotiations
can produce acceptable bargains, monitoring,
and verification can be accomplished with necessary
transparency, and those outliers seeking to bash
their way into the club can be excluded. Is this fair?
Neither nonproliferation nor any other serious goal in
international politics is likely to be obtained by means
that are entirely fair, but a less than entirely fair system
might still meet the criteria of decision rationality.
Those criteria include the premise that consensus on
major points of agreement has been reached across the
boundaries of diverse state interests and priorities.
In addition, trade-offs and side payments to reach
that consensus should not leave any nuclear armed
state in a constrained proliferation system with incentives
for cheating on the agreed numbers or, even
worse, for overturning the entire structure in favor of
nuclear adventurism. No arrangement of numbers can
restrict the elbow room of states and their leaders to
do harm, or good, based on domestic political motives
and the structure of the international system. Arms
control cannot substitute for politics; it can only take
advantage of favorable political climates to reduce the
probability of war or the disutility of war, if it occurs. 56
In the case of nuclear war or nuclear weapons spread,
the avoidance is to be preferred to the alternatives.
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