Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Using the numbers in Table 3-1 as points of departure,
we construct hypothetical, but not unrealistic,
U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces for the period
2017-2020 that are consistent with New START
guidelines and related policy statements made by officials
of both states. 50 These guidelines include:
(1) the expectation that both the United States
and Russia will maintain a triad of strategic nuclear
launchers, including land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers;
(2) no limitations on future defenses deployed by
either side, although a notification and withdrawal
clause exists that could allow either party to depart
the treaty for this or other reasons;
(3) counting rules that underrepresent the numbers
of weapons deployed on long-range bombers;
(4) postponement of the issues of stored nuclear
weapons and their related upload potential; and,
(5) a two step limitation on the numbers of deployed
intercontinental or transoceanic launchers—700
deployed and 100 additional nondeployed. 51
Figure 9-1 provides a drawdown curve of second
strike surviving and retaliating strategic nuclear warheads
for U.S. forces under New START deployment
limits of 1,550 weapons for each state. 52 Surviving and
retaliating warheads are calculated under each of four
operational conditions of alertness and launch readiness:
(1) forces are on generated alert and launched on
warning (GEN, LOW);
(2) forces are on generated alert and ride out the
attack before retaliating (GEN, ROA);
(3) forces are on day-to-day alert and launch on
warning (DAY, LOW); and,
439