Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

mittee, and Viktor Ozerov, the Head of the Defense
and Security Committee of the Federal Council, were
reportedly not permitted to attend. 3 As the agenda
emerged, Viktor Ilyukhin, a member of the State
Duma, said its success would largely depend upon
developing improved social conditions for servicemen,
procuring modern weapons, and enhancing the
manageability and discipline of the troops. Aleksandr
Vladimirov, the Vice-President of the College of Military
Experts, advocated developing new programs
and styles of teaching officers aimed at producing a
generation of officers with a deep understanding of
geopolitics and global trends. 4 The trouble is that few
understood the agenda precisely, which often resulted
in criticism not really matching what was unfolding,
or focusing upon one aspect at the expense of the
broader picture.
Serdyukov secured the formal approval of the collegium,
briefing them on Perspektivny oblik Vooruzhennykh
Sil RF i pervoocherednye mery po ego formirovaniu
na 2009-2020 gody (The Future Outlook of the Russian
Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation
in the period 2009-2020). At its heart, the reform concept
meant the abandonment of the mass mobilization
principle that had served the interests of the state
since the 19th century reforms conducted by Dmitry
Milyutin. This being the case, it would no longer make
sense to argue that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) posed any military threat to Russia
that required mobilization. That controversy was
well-concealed beneath plans to downsize, or more
accurately “streamline,” the officer corps. 5
In Orenburg on September 26, 2008, Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev met with the commanders of
military districts, outlined the reasons for reforming
34