Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

to reducing the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear
weapons below the levels agreed in the treaty signed
on April 8, 2010.
In a second step of the analysis, the connection between
nuclear arms reductions and nonproliferation
will be examined through the use of a pertinent “what
if” illustration of one hypothetical, but realistic, world
environment. If, for example, the United States and
Russia can agree to lower-than-New START levels of
strategic retaliatory forces, their remaining maximum
levels for deployed nuclear weapons could be the
basis for a constrained nuclear proliferation system
among the existing recognized and de facto nuclear
weapons states. This connection between American
and Russian vertical disarmament and responsibility
for leadership on nonproliferation is not hypothetical
or academic, but legal and operational. 49
As acknowledged nuclear weapons states under
the protocols of the nuclear NPT, the United States
and Russia (among others) are required to engage in
nuclear arms reductions and arms limitation. Operationally,
the United States and Russia have the largest
nuclear arsenals, the most experience with nuclear
force operations, and the most experience in negotiating
nuclear arms control agreements. In short, the connection
between U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions
and downstream success in controlling the spread of
nuclear weapons is explicit, despite the denials of cynics,
nay sayers, and prophets of inevitable nuclear proliferation
and doomsday. On the other hand, accepting
responsibility for action is not the same thing as
accomplishing it. The United States and Russia cannot
necessarily get the rest of the nuclear club to march in
step with their ambitions, even when Washington and
Moscow are agreed.
436