Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

linear to nonlinear strategies for risk reduction. Serial
progress in U.S. and Russian nuclear arms limitation is
a realistic expectation, but not a guaranty of nonlinear
success stories in nonproliferation or in disarmament.
To achieve broader objectives in nuclear renunciation,
states will have to leapfrog beyond purely statist models
of defense and deterrence into more communitarian
and regional, or even global, paradigms of reference.
The shared space of nuclear danger includes
threats, not only from existing and aspiring nuclear
weapons states, but also from nonstate actors such
as terrorists with apocalyptic or other anti-systemic
agendas. 48 The two dangers are linked in theory and
in practice: the more states with nuclear weapons and
with anti-systemic grievances, the more vulnerable are
the commons to lapses in nuclear security and, perhaps,
nuclear terrorism. States that fail, individually
and collectively, to embrace nuclear risk reduction or
elimination could find themselves in the target coordinates
of future extremists who are beyond deterrence.
METHODOLOGY
Approach.
The preceding discussion sets the stage for the
following analysis. The methodology will proceed in
two principal steps. First, a statistical model is used to
test the adequacy of projected U.S. and Russian strategic
nuclear forces that are New START-compliant. As
part of this framework, an examination is provided to
determine if smaller forces for either state could meet
the criteria for deterrence sufficiency and stability.
The comparison with possible post-New START forces
is not an idle academic exercise. Both the United
States and Russia have indicated that the door is open
435