Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

war. The conflict also served as a warning to Georgia
about poorly timed and ill-considered military brinkmanship.
The war advertised how far away Russia’s
conventional military forces are from those suited to
the aspirations of a major regional or global military
power.
Among some Russian government officials and
other elites, it is now recognized that broad changes in
foreign policy must accompany, if not precede, the accomplishment
of significant military reform. On this
point, in May 2010 the Russian edition of Newsweek
magazine published a draft document from the Russian
foreign ministry that was prepared earlier in February
for President Medvedev. 28 According to press
reports, the foreign ministry document calls for a new
Russian foreign policy, emphasizing improved relations
with the United States and the European Union
(EU) in order to expedite technology development
and a more favorable climate for investment in Russia.
29 Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center,
writing in the Moscow Times, assessed the draft doctrine
and its implications thus:
Russia is losing ground in the global pecking order by
falling behind in terms of its industrial, technological,
and scientific capabilities. All the proceeds from Gazprom’s
sales notwithstanding, Russia is sorely lacking
what it takes to be a major global economic and political
force in the 21st century. Relative energy abundance
and nuclear arsenals are simply not enough. 30
An alternative perspective on the draft document
was provided by Andrei Tsygankov, who regarded its
interpretation as a pro-Western shift in Russian foreign
policy as “not incorrect” but “insufficient.” Tsygankov
argues that Russia’s rapprochement with the
427