Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

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53. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010,” available from www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010. 54. Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s New Military Doctrine: An Exercise in Public Relations,” February 8, 2010, available from russiamil.wordpress.com/2010/02/08/russias-new-military-doc. 55. “Eight Years of Falling Behind and Weakening,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, No. 27, February 13, 2008, available from FBIS SOV, February 14, 2008. 56. “Sword of the Empire,” Zavtra, October 5, 2008, available from FBIS SOV, October 6, 2008. 57. Ibid. 58. “Russian General Outlines Plan to Supply Army with New Armored Equipment,” Interfax, November 15, 2008, available from FBIS SOV, November 16, 2008. 59. “National Security Priorities: Improving Legislative Support for Military Organizational Development,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer, June 20, 2009, available from FBIS SOV, June 21, 2009. 60. “Russian Military Refuses to Buy Russian Army’s Inferior to Foreign Counterparts,” Interfax, April 19, 2010, available from FBIS SOV, April 22, 2010. 61. “Ultimatum to Defense Industry: The Russian Army Has Already Been Forced to Purchase Weapons form Overseas Firms,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 11, 2010, available from FBIS SOV, April 12, 2010. 31
Page 1 and 2: Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Pres
Page 3 and 4: ***** Comments pertaining to this r
Page 5 and 6: Part III 6. Caught between Scylla a
Page 8 and 9: INTRODUCTION As of November 2010, t
Page 10 and 11: future reductions to a 1,000 warhea
Page 12 and 13: CHAPTER 1 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AND CONVE
Page 14 and 15: States (CIS). For a number of reaso
Page 16 and 17: with nuclear weapons alone. General
Page 18 and 19: cratic politics that Kvashnin revel
Page 20 and 21: PUTIN AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF
Page 22 and 23: sequences flowing therefrom.” 22
Page 24 and 25: its rightful conclusion.” 29 In t
Page 26 and 27: The words about the priority of nuc
Page 28 and 29: If the constant failures by the Bul
Page 30 and 31: LONG-RANGE AVIATION Using the one o
Page 32 and 33: prepare themselves against.” 51 A
Page 34 and 35: that day the directorates were enga
Page 36 and 37: USING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO O
Page 38 and 39: 2. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Russia’s
Page 40 and 41: 28. “Hope Glimmers for Reform,”
Page 44 and 45: CHAPTER 2 RUSSIA’S CONVENTIONAL A
Page 46 and 47: the armed forces, and referred to f
Page 48 and 49: size-fits-all approach, although th
Page 50 and 51: combined. 23 The prestigious Genera
Page 52 and 53: there is a concerted effort to mini
Page 54 and 55: • The General Staff wants to deve
Page 56 and 57: procurement (estimates within the R
Page 58 and 59: whose creation in Russia progresses
Page 60 and 61: the system of staffing, optimizatio
Page 62 and 63: an interview by the Deputy Defense
Page 64 and 65: adoption of network-centric warfare
Page 66 and 67: even contains self-contradictory st
Page 68 and 69: To begin with, the doctrine defines
Page 70 and 71: WMD proliferation and related techn
Page 72 and 73: Chechen war and instances of domest
Page 74 and 75: differences between the military do
Page 76 and 77: 15, 2009, that such revisions were
Page 78 and 79: that the conventional transformatio
Page 80 and 81: actions are needed and preemptive a
Page 82 and 83: such reluctance to reduce or elimin
Page 84 and 85: When the issue is national security
Page 86 and 87: tion), Russia has 5,400 of these wa
Page 88 and 89: Following the signing of the New ST
Page 90 and 91: military reform would be upset by p
Page 92 and 93:
expected the Kremlin to pursue glob
Page 94 and 95:
to that adopted in the Krasnaya Zve
Page 96 and 97:
in extending such discussions to in
Page 98 and 99:
tential defense cooperation opportu
Page 100 and 101:
18. Виктор Юбашев, Юз
Page 102 and 103:
курьер, номер 4, фев
Page 104 and 105:
ister, General Staff at Odds Over R
Page 106 and 107:
80. Ibid. 81. Aleksandr Konovalov,
Page 108:
97. Ibid. 98. Karaganov, “The Ech
Page 111 and 112:
of the state, and other factors. To
Page 113 and 114:
nents into protracted bargaining an
Page 115 and 116:
ABM system. According to informatio
Page 117 and 118:
for them. It also took into account
Page 119 and 120:
Academician of the Russian Academy
Page 121 and 122:
troop withdrawals from Eastern Euro
Page 123 and 124:
nity of Independent States (CIS), t
Page 125 and 126:
and patriotism. 42 While there is n
Page 127 and 128:
sia is a great nuclear power. No on
Page 129 and 130:
they built for?” 55 He did not me
Page 131 and 132:
insist upon in 1991 was re-establis
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as WMD nonproliferation, global and
Page 135 and 136:
tegic Missile Troops at the Teikovo
Page 137 and 138:
Obama, there will appear a new type
Page 139 and 140:
Justifications for modernization of
Page 141 and 142:
sion of the Military Doctrine was o
Page 143 and 144:
There are reasons to assert that th
Page 145 and 146:
Measures to deal with the above “
Page 147 and 148:
creation of new weapon systems and
Page 149 and 150:
of grand declarations that often ha
Page 151 and 152:
approximate equality of capabilitie
Page 153 and 154:
Internal Russian Evolution. Russia
Page 155 and 156:
army.lv/ru/yadernoe-oruzhie/901/245
Page 157 and 158:
14. See “Concepts of SNF Developm
Page 159 and 160:
36. See Andre de Nesnera, “Who Is
Page 161 and 162:
53. See Robert Legvold, “Russia
Page 163 and 164:
67. See Nikolai Sokov, “The Russi
Page 165 and 166:
78. Vladimir Dvorkin, “START on t
Page 167 and 168:
99. “The First-Strike Doctrine,
Page 169 and 170:
117 . Vladimir Putin, “Speech and
Page 172 and 173:
CHAPTER 4 RUSSIA’S SECURITY RELAT
Page 174 and 175:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Page 176 and 177:
conceptualized as an energy super-p
Page 178 and 179:
This great variety of poorly specif
Page 180 and 181:
ility cannot be created by declarin
Page 182 and 183:
forces would make nuclear capabilit
Page 184 and 185:
a) preventing the United States fro
Page 186 and 187:
don the INF Treaty, particularly si
Page 188 and 189:
the same time, a nuclear-armed Iran
Page 190 and 191:
to figure out which combination of
Page 192 and 193:
3. A key proponent of this view is
Page 194 and 195:
17. See Sergei Zhuravlev, “On com
Page 196:
31. Mikhail Gorbachev has recently
Page 199 and 200:
Internet forums will find participa
Page 201 and 202:
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (
Page 203 and 204:
7. The current trends will make Rus
Page 205 and 206:
future international system as base
Page 207 and 208:
eration and war prevention: this be
Page 209 and 210:
led Russian military planners to re
Page 211 and 212:
In a review of an unpublished early
Page 213 and 214:
• It is assumed that if Russia ca
Page 215 and 216:
against Russia or its allies, nucle
Page 217 and 218:
esistance by Russian conventional f
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on nuclear weapons alone is simply
Page 221 and 222:
under which these weapons could be
Page 223 and 224:
mid-1990s during debates about poss
Page 225 and 226:
ern theaters differ by the nature o
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it. It is commonly believed that Ru
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portant player, has many other more
Page 231 and 232:
service time is regularly extended,
Page 233 and 234:
production of Topol (SS-25) was rep
Page 235 and 236:
MIRVed ICBM and even the rail-mobil
Page 237 and 238:
submarine in the new class, Yuri Do
Page 239 and 240:
the 2000s, the Air Force became the
Page 241 and 242:
MISSILE DEFENSE IN U.S.-RUSSIAN REL
Page 243 and 244:
plans. Concern about future capabil
Page 245 and 246:
a positive first step toward a fina
Page 247 and 248:
of the defense system (and have the
Page 249 and 250:
In the absence of a final solution,
Page 251 and 252:
the moment. By and large, this conc
Page 253 and 254:
it was fairly often reported in the
Page 255 and 256:
or more years. Given multiple delay
Page 257 and 258:
they were part of Russian desire to
Page 259 and 260:
anks of retired generals who claime
Page 261 and 262:
exists an important asymmetry: Whil
Page 263 and 264:
11. Sergei Ivanov’s statement at
Page 265 and 266:
31. Vadim Smirnov, “Kalinigradski
Page 267 and 268:
42. The National Resource Defense C
Page 269 and 270:
62. RIA-Novosti, July 24, 2008 63.
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Ru, February 16, 2007; Nikolai Poro
Page 273 and 274:
e assumed that Russia has never bee
Page 275 and 276:
sue their policy of military superi
Page 277 and 278:
other is to try and return to the p
Page 279 and 280:
America was actively trying to stea
Page 281 and 282:
The Military Doctrine provides a vi
Page 283 and 284:
the importance of a transformation
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• Henceforth, all military units
Page 287 and 288:
the Air Force is reported to be rec
Page 289 and 290:
military’s conventional capabilit
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Missile (ABM) Treaty and refusal to
Page 293 and 294:
As the self-perceived isolated grea
Page 295 and 296:
military security challenges of the
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military. Technology limitations, i
Page 299 and 300:
Russia needs either to build a conv
Page 301 and 302:
19. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Former
Page 304 and 305:
CHAPTER 7 RUSSIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON
Page 306 and 307:
centered on the real possibility of
Page 308 and 309:
conventional wars. The public debat
Page 310 and 311:
have been a much more robust high-t
Page 312 and 313:
Even though defense spending has be
Page 314 and 315:
Medvedev announced in May 2010 subs
Page 316 and 317:
NATO/U.S. and Chinese air and other
Page 318 and 319:
assert Russia’s identity as a gre
Page 320 and 321:
Russian political system which cann
Page 322 and 323:
leaders like Lieutenant General Yev
Page 324 and 325:
to maintain parity are now being in
Page 326 and 327:
tially hostile forces in both the e
Page 328 and 329:
Security Advisor James L. Jones,
Page 330 and 331:
fenses once this treaty is ratified
Page 332 and 333:
that having created an umbrella aga
Page 334 and 335:
Army (PLA). 97 Similarly, proof of
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interference. In political terms, i
Page 338 and 339:
Russia to apply them in order to ma
Page 340 and 341:
The asymmetric escalation posture i
Page 342 and 343:
Finally, we must understand that Ru
Page 344 and 345:
this Russian statement essentially
Page 346 and 347:
consequences of the Democratic Peop
Page 348 and 349:
ate a real strategic partnership th
Page 350 and 351:
Neither are Russian military analys
Page 352 and 353:
consequences of NATO enlargement, t
Page 354 and 355:
Russia’s reaction to Asian milita
Page 356 and 357:
Russian commentators noted that he
Page 358 and 359:
CONCLUSIONS Nuclear weapons issues
Page 360 and 361:
4. Military Doctrine of the Russian
Page 362 and 363:
2008, pp. 97-128; Stanislav Secrier
Page 364 and 365:
48. Colin Gray, House of Cards, Ith
Page 366 and 367:
69. Transcript of Remarks and Respo
Page 368 and 369:
87. “Interview with Foreign Minis
Page 370 and 371:
110. “Russia RVSN Military Academ
Page 372 and 373:
133. Jonathan Pollack, “U.S. Stra
Page 374 and 375:
Taiwan Strait and the Future of Chi
Page 376 and 377:
CHAPTER 8 RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR
Page 378 and 379:
ased Intercontinental Ballistic Mis
Page 380 and 381:
also not well enforced. The Nuclear
Page 382 and 383:
The Soviet and Russian Armed Forces
Page 384 and 385:
nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov confi
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• large-scale conflicts such as W
Page 388 and 389:
preemptive strike, is not ruled out
Page 390 and 391:
Asia, Russian leaders see resorting
Page 392 and 393:
In response, Russian leaders threat
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any such intent. In July 2010, Alek
Page 396 and 397:
tional conflict that Russia risked
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etween signaling Moscow’s serious
Page 400 and 401:
to bring to reason anyone who could
Page 402 and 403:
than the existing PNIs, which lack
Page 404 and 405:
taken place or are in the process o
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in the next round of U.S.-Russian a
Page 408 and 409:
and Britain characterize their nucl
Page 410 and 411:
e dealt with as part of the NATO-Ru
Page 412 and 413:
CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR POSSIBILITIES A
Page 414 and 415:
a majority of Russian respondents (
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7. Sergei Zhuravlev, “On Combat R
Page 418 and 419:
23. See for example: “The Nationa
Page 420 and 421:
available from www.nytimes.com/2008
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Ogaryovo, June 9, 2006, President o
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72. “Russia Warns U.S. about Weap
Page 426:
news%5D=34834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5
Page 429 and 430:
currency. Russian-American strategi
Page 431 and 432:
The U.S. will continue to deploy an
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noted that U.S. policy was generall
Page 435 and 436:
to create a conventional-nuclear fi
Page 437 and 438:
achieve transformative goals in the
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West is taking place within a large
Page 441 and 442:
U.S nuclear weapons during the Cold
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States to repatriate or destroy all
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In doing so, the leaders of Russia
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to reducing the numbers of deployed
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United States July 2009 Old START l
Page 451 and 452:
(4) forces are on day to day alert
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1,000 instead of 1,550? In Figures
Page 455 and 456:
possible concert with sympathetic K
Page 457 and 458:
The findings in Figure 9-6 show tha
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the problem, from a Russian perspec
Page 461 and 462:
6. Robert M. Gates, “The Case for
Page 463 and 464:
14. Daryl G. Kimball, “Obama’s
Page 465 and 466:
27. According to some experts, Russ
Page 467 and 468:
44. See George Perkovich, “After
Page 469 and 470:
56. An argument in favor of a multi
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multipolar context and speaks of Ru
Page 473 and 474:
For well over 2 decades, Soviet and
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strikes seemed to have been designe
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als, since combat potential, when n
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The gamble on the nature of future
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FACING WEST AND EAST For Russia, wh
Page 483 and 484:
tional system had shifted to a unip
Page 485 and 486:
cal Islamic elements there and acro
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gic mobility and underscored the ne
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the transportation infrastructure t
Page 491 and 492:
tion of China as a strategic threat
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concerns have become greater as the
Page 495 and 496:
eforms of the Russian military, off
Page 497 and 498:
ing tasks with small subunits. We h
Page 499 and 500:
American superpower. In 2002, Nikon
Page 501 and 502:
nario had left open the interventio
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der Guards, speak of Chinese effort
Page 505 and 506:
military. In the absence of such a
Page 507 and 508:
formed conventional forces might ac
Page 509 and 510:
15. On the facilities in these two
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Daalder, The CFE Treaty: An Overvie
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57. “Vostok-2010 bez konkretnykh
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS STEPHEN J. B
Page 518 and 519:
the U.S. Government as the director
Page 520 and 521:
seminal chapter in a forthcoming bo
Page 522 and 523:
Eurasia (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem:
Page 524 and 525:
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE This Publicat
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