Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

and Britain characterize their nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles as strategic rather than nonstrategic weapons,
they and other NATO governments, including Washington,
have resisted their inclusion in any nonstrategic
negotiations. The following year, General Nikolai
Makarov, General Baluyevsky’s replacement as head
of the Russian General Staff, told ITAR-TASS that the
Russian Armed Forces had no intention of eliminating
its TNWs “as long as Europe is unstable and packed
with armaments”—a condition that could be used indefinitely
to characterize the military situation on the
Continent pending universal disarmament (though
Makarov probably meant the continued existence of
NATO and its robust conventional forces). 76
Russians outside the executive branch have been
somewhat more creative and flexible in considering
how to achieve some TNW arms control—suggesting
linking talks on reducing Russian TNWs, an area of
Russian advantage, in return for U.S. and NATO concessions
regarding strategic offensive nuclear weapons
(especially by reducing the larger number of U.S.
non-deployed nuclear warheads), strategic defenses,
or the conventional force imbalance in Europe, which
presently favors NATO. 77 Western analysts have offered
similar proposals, linking Russian concessions
regarding TNWs to NATO’s accepting limits on its
conventional superiority through an enhanced Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 78 Other Western
analysts have proposed extending the provisions
of the bilateral INF Treaty to encompass both shorterrange
missiles and additional countries. 79 Before assuming
office, a senior advisor to Secretary of State
Clinton suggested removing some or all U.S. TNWs
from NATO Europe in return for encouraging Russia
simply to concentrate its large number of TNWs in
397