Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

a U.S.-NATO attack. In his May 2006 address, Putin
himself reaffirmed the ambitious force planning goal
that Russia’s Armed Forces must be “able to simultaneously
fight in global, regional and—if necessary—
also in several local conflicts.” 59 Only a large conventional
military backstopped by strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons can meet such demanding criteria.
TNW ARMS CONTROL
Many Western arms control advocates favor elimifavor
eliminating
TNW because their small size, scattered location,
relative mobility, and weaker security and safety
features (the older Russian systems are thought to lack
advanced electronic locks) render them more at risk
for terrorist seizure than the nuclear warheads that are
deployed on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which
are generally some of the most well-guarded military
assets in the Russian and American defense communities.
60 These arms control specialists also fear that Russia
and the United States are more likely to employ a
TNW than a strategic nuclear warhead. In addition to
their generally lower yield, their battlefield missions
encourage commanders to see them as weapons for
warfighting rather than deterrence. 61 In turn, this status
might place them under the tactical control of field
commanders in certain conditions. A RAND Corporation
(RAND) study concluded that some Russian
operational commanders can launch ground-based
TNW without further central government approval
after Russia’s civilian national security leaders have
authorized their deployment to front-line troops. 62
Pending their elimination, analysts concerned about
TNWs seek to bring non-strategic weapons under a
more formal and transparent arms control regime
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