Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

tional conflict that Russia risked losing. The January
2000 National Security Concept, for example, implied
that Russia could use nonstrategic nuclear forces to
resist a conventional attack without engendering a
full-scale nuclear exchange. Russian strategists have
also indicated that they might detonate a limited number
of nuclear weapons—perhaps just one—to induce
an adversary to end (“de-escalate” in Russian terminology)
a conventional military conflict with Russia. 49
The selective strike would seek to exploit the inevitable
“shock and awe” effect associated with nuclear
use to cause the targeted decisionmakers to weigh
the risks of nuclear devastation more heavily. This
strategy exploits the fear that, after one nuclear explosion,
the prospects of further detonations increase
substantially. Initiating nuclear use would underscore
the seriousness with which the Russian Government
viewed the situation and might encourage the other
side to de-escalate the conflict and to pressure its allies
into making concessions.
A related function of Russia’s nuclear forces would
be to prevent other countries from escalating a conventional
conflict to a nuclear war. In such a scenario,
Russia could threaten to retaliate disproportionately
should an adversary employ nuclear weapons to try
to alter a conventional battle in its favor. Even after
one party has initiated a limited nuclear exchange,
Russian commanders might attempt to control further
intra-war escalation by issuing nuclear threats, showing
restraint, or pursuing other “nuclear signaling.”
The most commonly discussed contingency for a “deescalation”
mission is a NATO decision to intervene
against a Russian military ally (e.g., Belarus) or on
behalf of a nonmember country (e.g., Georgia) in a
conflict with Russia. In its 1993 Military Doctrine, the
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