Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Asia, Russian leaders see resorting to—or at least
threatening to employ—nuclear weapons as an essential
equalizer. In December 2006, Russian President
Vladimir Putin reportedly told Ivanov that Russia’s
nuclear forces account for 90 percent of the country’s
security. 30 According to Russian nuclear expert Alexei
Arbatov: “Nuclear weapons are for Russian people
now much more important than decades ago. . . . They
are more important than during the Cold War times as
a pillar of national security.” 31 This assessment makes
sense given that during the Cold War period, Moscow
disposed of massive conventional military power in
the form of both the Soviet Armed Forces and the military
forces of its captive Warsaw Pact allies.
As in Cold War times, however, Russian leaders
continue to issue nuclear threats to try to influence the
foreign and defense policies of other countries. In recent
years, Russian leaders have proclaimed their intent
to consider nuclear strikes against former Soviet
bloc states that join NATO or establish U.S. ballistic
missile systems or military bases on their territory. In
addition to whatever Russian security dangers these
Russian nuclear threats tried to avert, the threats also
aimed to support Moscow’s claim that the former Soviet
states fall within Russia’s special security zone—a
type of sphere of influence in which Moscow asserted
the right to veto foreign and defense policies of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries
that Russian leaders might perceive as a challenge to
Moscow’s vital national interests. Polish Prime Minister
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, for instance, characterized
Russian threats as an attempt to establish that his
country still falls within Moscow’s zone of control
when international security issues arise: “We are talking
about the status of Poland and Russia’s hopes that
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