Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

If Russian leaders are to decrease their reliance on
nuclear security, they must feel that their security is
some manner enhanced, a conclusion that is not readily
apparent to them at the present. If we are to convince
the Russians of the rightness of reducing their
reliance on nuclear weapons, like it or not, we must
understand their perspective and take it seriously.
Otherwise, as has all too often been the case, we will
continue to talk at or past each other. Russia demands
that it be taken seriously. While doing so might not
and probably should not lead to our approval of their
policies or thinking, taking Russian nuclear postures
seriously means engaging with their strategy and policies,
not dismissing them outright or worse, deprecating
our own capabilities on the basis of a hoped-for
end that is not grounded in empirical validation. Until
such time as we or others can persuade other states
that they do not need nuclear weapons to defend
themselves against us or anyone else, the mere repetition
of the incantation that nuclear weapons serve no
useful purpose in utter defiance of the facts is merely
an invitation to a disaster.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 7
1. Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Arms control After a Time
of Troubles” Mark Galeotti, ed., The Politics of Security in Modern
Russia, Farnham, Surrey, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2009, pp. 105-122.
2. Stephen Blank, “Undeterred: The Return of Nuclear War,”
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, Summer/Fall,
2000, pp. 55-63.
3. Simon Saradzhyan, Russia’s Support For Zero: Tactical Move
or Long-term Commitment? Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center, Harvard
University, 2009, available from belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/russias-support-for-zero.pdf.
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