Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Consequently, 162 Vasilenko also stated that the nature
and composition of any future U.S.-NATO missile
defense would determine the nature and number of
future Russian missile forces and systems. Therefore,
he argued in 2005 that:
Russia should give priority to high-survivable mobile
ground and naval missile systems when planning the
development of the force in the near and far future. . . .
The quality of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia
will have to be significantly improved in terms of adding
to their capability of penetrating [missile defense]
barriers and increasing the survivability of combat elements
and enhancing the properties of surveillance
and control systems. 163
Obviously such advocacy represents a transparent
demand for new, vast, and unaffordable military programs,
similar to the demand for reactivating production
of IRBMs regardless of consequences. But in that
case, Russia’s government and military are, as Nikolai
Sokov suggested, postulating an inherent East-West
enmity that is only partially and incompletely buttressed
by mutual deterrence. 164 Vasilenko’s recommended
posture makes no sense in today’s strategic
climate, especially when virtually every Russian military
leader repeatedly proclaims, as did Chief of Staff
General Yuri Baluyevsky through 2006, that no plan
for war with NATO is under consideration and that
the main threat to Russia is terrorism, not NATO and
not America. 165 But since then, as is apparent to everyone,
NATO and America have become enemy number
one. Nevertheless, at the same time, that posture also
openly warns Beijing and Tehran of Russian suspicions
concerning their ambitions and capabilities.
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