Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

The following analysis from 2004 took into account
both the limited nuclear capability China had at that
time and the possibilities that could ensue based on
the ongoing development of those forces:
Despite the significant qualitative makeup of the current
Chinese nuclear missile potential, its combat capabilities
are quite limited; it would hardly be adequate to
destroy highly protected command and control posts
and could not substantially degrade Russia’s ground
and sea-based strategic nuclear forces. However, this
potential would be capable of substantially degrading
the Russian Federation Armed Forces group in
the Far Eastern theater of Military Operations and of
doing major damage to the population and economy
not only in the Far Eastern and Urals regions, but even
in the Central Region of European Russia. According
to available data, so far China does not have missile
systems with MIRVed warheads, but the upsurge in
activity related to the building of antimissile defense
systems could accelerate its development of that type
of weapons system, including antimissile defense
countermeasures. It should be noted that the PRC’s
economic and technological potential is quite adequate
for a quantitative and qualitative breakthrough in the
area of its strategic offensive weapons development. 156
Given the aforementioned discoveries of growing
Chinese interest in and capabilities for using nuclear
weapons that suggest consideration of a second strike
capability, which can also put much pressure on Russia’s
Pacific Fleet and Russian Asia, it is understandable
why we see a rethinking of Russia’s nuclear strategy
in Asia. 157
Thus, Moscow is already increasingly ambivalent
about the INF Treaty of 1987-88. While this part of a
heightened ambivalence about most of the Gorbachevera’s
arms control treaties are very much tied to the
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