Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Neither are Russian military analysts or planners
unaware of the possibility of Chinese military threats,
even though they do not frequently discuss them.
These threats are usually debated by people who are
critical of the partnership with China or who profess
to believe, as is apparently now the case, that they
have at least 10 years before China can be a real threat
and that China is currently not a real threat to Russia.
151 Even so, at least some writers have pointed out
that the rise in China’s capabilities could go beyond
a conventional threat to Russian assets in Siberia and
Russian Asia.
For example, China’s “no first use” of nuclear
weapons injunction in Chinese military doctrine is
coming under pressure from younger officers there. 152
Thus China is now debating retention of its no first
use posture regarding nuclear weapons, and such
weapons appear to be playing a more prominent role
in Chinese strategy than was hitherto believed to be
the case. China is building a previously undisclosed
nuclear submarine base in the Pacific and a major
nuclear base in its interior, moves that suggest consideration
of a second strike capability, but that can
also put much pressure on Russia’s Pacific Fleet and
Russian Asia. 153 Indeed, China’s new DH-10 cruise
missile represents a significant advance in China’s
own TNW capability, as does the operationalization
of several cruise missile brigades. Even if Taiwan is
the focus of Chinese military planning, that planning
still identifies Russia and the United States (as well as
India) as potential enemies, thereby envisaging possible
nuclear scenarios against them. 154 If Vostok-2010
is any guide, the simulated launching of TNW and of
Tochka-U precision missile strikes against China suggests
that the role of TNW in Asia will grow, not decrease.
155
339