Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

tedly self-inflated status that it claims for itself either in
Europe or in Asia. Interestingly enough, while China,
according to most analysts, had been seen as desisting
from challenging the U.S. missile defense program
by a vigorous program of building nuclear weapons,
Russia seems ready to do so even though the utility of
that program for its overall interests, which normally
focus on getting the West to include it as a major international
actor, is decidedly moot. 146
Russian opposition to an American missile defense
system goes back a decade, and Russia argued against
its appearance in Asia, using every available Asian
security forum to voice its opposition at that time. 147
By 2005, it also was becoming apparent that the placement
of such defenses in the Asia-Pacific as part of the
U.S. alliance system was part of an effort to create a
bloc to isolate Russia. 148 And now, as it increasingly
appears Russian hopes that a peaceful resolution of
the North Korean nuclear problem would undermine
Washington’s justification for Asian missile defenses
will be dashed, it may have decided to go on the offensive
in Asia just as it has in Europe. 149
While Western and U.S. scholars and policy, seen
from Moscow’s point of view, tend to marginalize
Russia as an actor in Asia, Russia made up its mind
to react. 150 Russia perceives U.S. nuclear policy as part
of an overarching strategy to isolate and threaten it,
and therefore is responding accordingly, asymmetrically
as promised. Thus its response includes: partnership,
if not alliance, with China; pressure on Japan to
desist from targeting Russia with its missile defenses,
coupled with alternating offers of economic incentives
for partnership in the region; and the nuclearization
of the Pacific Fleet to ensure robust deterrence and a
second-strike capability.
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