Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

consequences of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear and missile tests has been the
strengthened impetus it gave to U.S.-Japan cooperation
on missile defense. The issue of missile defense
in Asia had been in a kind of abeyance, but the North
Korean nuclear tests of 2006, made in defiance of Chinese
warnings against nuclearization and testing, intensified
and accelerated the Japanese and American
collaboration on missile defenses as the justification
for them had now been incontrovertibly demonstrated.
But such programs always entail checking China,
which naturally is considerably annoying to Beijing. 133
Therefore, China continues to criticize U.S.-Japan collaboration
on missile defenses publicly. 134 Perhaps this
issue was on Chinese President Hu Jintao’s mind in
September 2007 when he called for greater Russo-Chinese
cooperation in Asia-Pacific security. 135
Russian experts long ago noted that the military
balance in the Asia-Pacific was unfavorable to Russia
and specifically invoked the specter of Russia losing
its nuclear naval potential there. 136 That nuclear naval
potential remains precarious as Moscow recently admitted
that its submarines conducted a total of three
patrols in 2007. 137 In fact, in the Pacific, according to
Japanese sources, Moscow is deploying formerly retired
ships like the nuclear powered Admiral Lazarev,
a decommissioned Kirov class cruiser, to counter the
rise in Chinese power and deter threats ranging from
an outbreak of war in Korea to growing Chinese naval
and strike power along with U.S. buildups. 138 To
overcome these weaknesses and threats, and thanks to
Russia’s economic resurgence (largely energy-driven,
however), then President Vladimir Putin and Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov announced a planned strategic
upgrade for the Pacific Fleet, specifically to address
335