Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Army (PLA). 97 Similarly, proof of the intended use of
nuclear weapons in Europe appeared in the Russian
combined arms exercises entitled Ladoga and Zapad
2009, which were divided in two to avoid CFE treaty
monitoring and which prominently featured nuclear
strikes against a so-called Polish-Lithuanian offensive
against Belarus which was defended by both native
and Russian forces. Given the manifestations here of
an old fashioned Soviet tank offensive but using newer
arms, the presence of nuclear strikes, and the new
command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I) organizations developed by Russia with its reforms
since 2006 (and presumably information warfare
operations), it is hardly surprising that Baltic littoral
states feel threatened and demand more security.
Beyond that, Russia is building new nuclear missiles
whose main attribute is their ability to evade U.S.
missile defenses and as part of the new prioritization
of its nuclear forces will deploy over 70 strategic missiles,
over 30 short-range Iskander missiles, and a
large number of booster rockets and aircraft. 98 Moscow
will also spend $35.3 billion on serial production of
all weapons in 2009-11 (1 trillion rubles) and virtually
doubled the number of strategic missile launches to
13 in 2009. 99 This procurement policy represents both
a quantum leap in Russian capabilities if it can be accomplished.
But more importantly, it also would constitute
a major step in a new action-reaction cycle of
procurements based on the old Cold War paradigm.
Indeed, these dynamics could lead to a new arms race,
especially if Russia insists that any new treaty should
first eliminate the missile defenses in Eastern Europe
as a condition of its acceptance and consummation.
The remarks by Patrushev in October 2009 that
triggered the debate are fully consonant with the mili-
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