Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

The radical changes that have occurred since the end
of the Cold War in international relations and the considerable
reduction of the threat that a large-scale war,
even more so a nuclear one, could be unleashed, have
contributed to the fact that in the system of views on
the role of nuclear arms both in Russia and the U.S.,
a political rather than military function has begun to
prevail. In relation to this, besides the traditional forms
and methods in the combat use of the RVSN [Strategic
Rocket Forces], a new notion “special actions” by the
groupings of strategic offensive arms has emerged—
Such actions mean the RVSN’s containment actions,
their aim to prevent the escalation of a high-intensity
non-nuclear military conflict against the Russian Federation
and its allies. 94
In other words, though there is no threat or a diminishing
threat of large-scale war, a new mission for
nuclear weapons will be for their use in actions during
such a war to control intra-war escalation. It is not
surprising that Solovtsov argued for increasing the
forces under his command, but it also is the case that
such dialectical reasoning makes no sense unless one
postulates an a priori hostility between East and West
and grants Russia the right of deterrence that it has
unilaterally arrogated to itself over other states who
have never publicly accepted it. Indeed, the new calls
for renovating the nuclear forces and having a solution
guaranteeing nuclear deterrence in all cases has
now become policy even if America deploys its global
defense system and moves to a defense dominant
world. 95
Makarov’s aforementioned statement concerning
retention of TNW could take place in potential European
contingencies, i.e., in the Baltic or in a war with
China. 96 In Vostok-2010, the exercise concluded with a
simulated TNW strike against the People’s Liberation
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