Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Since then Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov
recently stated that:
Issues of strategic offensive and defensive arms are
inextricably linked. To deny this relationship is meaningless
because it is the essence of relations between
the countries that have the appropriate potential in
both areas. An augmented capacity of one of the parties
in the realm of missile defense is automatically
echoed in the form of plans and decisions of the other
party in the realm of strategic offensive arms. And
not even obliquely, but in the most direct way what is
happening in the field of missile defense and U.S. relations
with its East European allies on this topic has an
impact on our START follow-on negotiations. Without
recognition of the relationship between strategic and
offensive defensive arms, there can be no such treaty,
it cannot take place. 89
Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov
told the Munich Security conference in February 2010:
It is impossible to speak of reducing nuclear potentials
in earnest while a state that possesses nuclear weapons
is developing and deploying systems of defense
against means of delivery of nuclear warheads that
other states possess. It is like the sword and shield
theory, where both are continuously developing with
the characteristics and resources of each of them being
kept in mind. 90
Putin’s aforementioned remarks fit right into this
outlook.
The problem is that our American partners are developing
missile defenses, and we are not . . . But the
issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are
closely interconnected. . . . There could be a danger
320