Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

fenses once this treaty is ratified. 86 Therefore, Russia
still seeks a veto on U.S. force decisions. When seen
in the context of Russian politics and overall defense
policy, this is a most instructive episode.
Third, since Moscow rigorously adheres to this
mutual hostage concept, it cannot trust the United
States, and any U.S. unilateral advance in defenses
must be compensated by greater Russian offensive
capabilities. The following citations demonstrate this
deep-rooted belief in the mutual hostage relationship,
deterrence of the enemy, and the action-reaction process
regarding armaments among the Russian political
and military leadership. First, Lavrov told an interviewer
in February 2007 that:
Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s
security and maintaining strategic stability as
much as possible. We have started such consultations
[on strategic nuclear weapons] already. I am convinced
that we need a substantive discussion on how those
lethal weapons could be curbed on the basis of mutual
trust and balance of forces and interests. We will insist
particularly on this approach. We do not need just the
talk that we are no longer enemies and therefore we
should not have restrictions for each other. This is not
the right approach. It is fraught with an arms race, in
fact, because, it is very unlikely that either of us will be
ready to lag behind a lot. 87
Here Lavrov signaled Russia’s unwillingness to
leave a mutually adversarial relationship with America
and its presupposition of mutual hostility as reflected
in both sides’ nuclear deployments. Similarly,
Alexei Arbatov ridiculed the Bush Administration’s
view, stated by Ambassador Linton Brooks, that because
the two sides are no longer adversaries, detailed
arms control talks are no longer necessary, as either
naiveté or outright hypocrisy. 88
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