Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

the global and regional levels entails not an unreachable
numerical parity, but rather a strategic stability
or equilibrium where both sides remain mutually
hostage to each other in a deterrent relationship and
where the United States cannot break free to pursue
its global or regional interests unilaterally.
Several practical strategic consequences flow from
this posture. First, under all circumstances, Russia
must retain the capability to intimidate Europe with
nuclear weapons and hold it hostage to that threat.
Therefore, the elite unanimously believes or professes
to believe that any U.S. missile defense is a threat, because
it presages a network covering Europe that will
negate Russia’s ability to threaten Europe and counter
its first-strike capability, even though Lavrov admitted
that the present stage of missile defense developments
do not threaten Russia. 67 This is particularly true
as the Obama administration’s plans envisage extending
the adapted phased construction of missile defenses
throughout Europe until 2020. 68 The unanimity
of the Russian elite puts the new treaty into jeopardy
even before it is ratified, because Russian statements
about missile defenses mean that if Russia should decide
that U.S. missile defense programs exceed Russia’s
definition of strategic stability within the treaty’s
limits, and therefore threaten Russia’s strategic deterrence
forces, then Russia can withdraw unilaterally
from the treaty. 69 Thus key members of the Duma, like
Speaker Boris Gryzlov, threatened to block ratification
if this legally binding linkage is omitted. 70
Russian demands also relate to the fact that according
to former Secretary of State George Shultz
and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, the
Russians that they have talked with still believe their
country is encircled (their word) by hostile or poten-
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