Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

prepare themselves against.” 51 A second factor was
the absence of a discussion of the threat of terrorism.
Meanwhile, under Ivanov’s direction (as President of
the Security Council), the latter was preparing a new
concept of national security, which according to the
Russian constitution is supposed to proceed and guide
the drafting of military doctrine. In fact, the drafting
of both documents would turn out to be more lengthy
than anticipated.
There was little change in the concept of nuclear
deterrence. Theoreticians like General Gareyev maintained
that it was critical to continue to build up Russia’s
nuclear deterrent. Interestingly, he also noted that
it would be important for the doctrine to pay attention
to “the development of general-purpose forces; the
Air Force, the Navy, and ground troops.” 52
In May 2009, Medvedev signed the National Security
Strategy Document, which laid the basis for the new
Military Doctrine document that he signed on February
5, 2010. Insofar as nuclear weapons were concerned,
the doctrine of preemption was not mentioned, but
the idea was retained. As the document states:
The Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize
nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear
and other types of weapons of mass destruction
against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression
against the Russian Federation involving the
use of conventional weapons when the very existence
of the state is under threat. 53
This led one commentator to call Russia’s new military
doctrine “An Exercise in Public Relations”—a
reference to the avoidance of the term preemption. 54
Otherwise, when it comes to nuclear weapons, the
document is not significantly different from previous
editions.
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