Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

state expenditures will supposedly fall by 4.5 percent,
allegedly through attrition of bureaucrats by 20 percent
through 2013, reducing the rise of administrative
costs, and the privatizations mentioned above. 33
In addition, “Popovkin announced plans to spend
this windfall to procure a thousand new helicopters in
ten years including heavy Mi-26 helicopters that can
carry 25 tons of cargo or more than 100 passengers for
short distances.” 34 The need for such weapons is quite
visible in the North Caucasus, which is on fire. Likewise,
Russia will also procure 20 new heavy AN-124
Ruslan transport aircraft and 60 new T-50 “fifth generation”
stealth jet fighters starting in 2013. Meanwhile,
Russia is already deploying new RS-24 intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs). 35 Thus by 2013, Russian
defense spending will be 2 trillion rubles more than
it is today and rise by 60 percent relative to 2010 figures.
These sums will go largely to nuclear, naval, and
air forces. 36 Indeed, the budget through 2013 raises
procurement by 50 percent above the earlier figures. 37
However, if one takes into account the costs of actually
procuring these airplanes, ships, etc., in reality rather
little can be built (and costs will rise and inefficiencies,
absent reform, will continue to add to these increased
costs ) and ultimately the deployment of hundreds
of airplanes and dozens of ships by 2015 and 2020 is
quite unlikely to materialize. 38
Obviously, lucrative and productive investment
will be squeezed in the coming budgets as is already
the case. It is most likely that without significant governmental
reform these increased outlays will be inefficiently
and ineffectively spent and will ultimately
increase inflationary pressures. While these procurements
plans were stimulated by real threats in the
North Caucasus and to the alleged threat presented by
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