Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

Medvedev announced in May 2010 substantially increased
that spending to 13 trillion rubles or $420 billion,
more than doubling the preceding figure. But, as
Frolov said, this would essentially deprive the Army
and Navy of funding for procurement that would allow
it to make up for a generation of neglect. Instead
he advocated an increase of the program to 36 trillion
rubles for the entire armed forces or $1.161 trillion
over the 2011-20 decade. If this proposal was unacceptable,
then at a minimum a program costing 28 trillion
rubles or $920 billion would allow the Army to
rearm. 31
Although many Duma deputies, officials, and
commentators, including Deputy Prime Minister Sergei
Ivanov who formerly supervised defense industry,
derided Frolov’s demands as wishful thinking, he
did in fact prevail. Vladimir Popovkin, Frolov’s boss,
told audiences at the Farnborough Show that the government
would spend 20 trillion rubles or $620 billion
more on procurement, less than Frolov asked for,
but still a large increase. Under these revised figures,
spending on research and development (R&D) and
procurement will exceed $50 billion annually. Perhaps
more importantly, total Russian defense spending may
reach 4-5 percent of GDP, more than any other major
power and a sign of creeping structural militarization.
Neither can we doubt the high rate of defense spending
in the annual budget. 32 Finance Minister Alexei
Kudrin recently conceded that budgetary outlays on
national defense would rise in 2010 by 13.3 percent,
while spending on national security and law enforcement
would go up by 8.8 percent. The overall rise in
those sectors through 2013 will be 22.1 percent. Since
spending on health care, culture, cinematography, and
education are also going up by hefty amounts, general
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