Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

centered on the real possibility of fighting wars from
an inferior strategic position. For example, a recent
Russian article describing the need for a fundamentally
new universal armored vehicle states that:
We must not neglect the preservation of the capabilities
for the restoration of the combat capability during
an exchange of nuclear strikes by the weapons and
equipment (VVT) system. After the employment of
weapons of mass destruction, a troop grouping must
rapidly take heart, rid itself of radioactive contamination,
restore its combat capability, and continue to
accomplish the combat missions. If that will not occur,
the permissibility of the conduct of a preventive
nuclear strike by Russia, which is declared in the
new Military Doctrine, simply doesn’t make sense.
The 1980s field regulations examined these variants of
the developments of events. Today rehearsals of operations
to restore combat capability after employment
of nuclear weapons are actually not being conducted. 5
(emphasis by author)
Moreover, Russia has incorporated nuclear warfighting
scenarios into its exercises in Europe as in Zapad-2009
and in Asia in the Vostok-2010 exercise. In
an otherwise unremarkable 2008 interview, General
Vladimir Boldyrev, then Commander in Chief of Russia’s
Ground Troops, described the missions of Russia’s
tank troops as follows:
Tank troops are employed primarily on main axes to
deliver powerful splitting attacks against the enemy
to a great depth. Having great resistance to damageproducing
elements of weapons of mass destruction,
high firepower, and high mobility and maneuverability,
they are capable of exploiting the results of nuclear
and fire strikes to the fullest and achieving assigned
objectives of a battle or operation in a short time. 6
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