Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

policy context, suggests that very strong objective and
subjective forces are driving Russia toward enhanced
reliance upon nuclear weapons, even as their numbers
decrease, for a host of critical (as seen by Moscow)
political and military missions. These factors exist irrespective
of numbers, because no Western analysis
known to this author has calculated how many nuclear
weapons that Russia actually needs or for what missions
(a common failing as well among much writing
on U.S. forces). Consequently, regardless of the numbers
of nuclear weapons that Russia may have in 2020
or 2030, it is also unlikely that the new arms control
treaty will lead Russia to embrace the idea of “global
zero” despite many favorable statements by Russian
leaders concerning this goal. 3 Indeed, the evidence to
date suggests that Moscow will be reluctant to conisder
any further reductions in nuclear forces without
a sizable reduction in what it considers to be threats
to Russian security. Those threats first comprise the
U.S./the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and China. Beyond that, they also comprise the new
nuclear proliferators, and then possibly terrorism.
Since the new Russian defense doctrine openly expects
the advent of new nuclear powers, the advent of
these proliferators, many of whom are concentrated
in Russia’s neighborhood, will provide added reasons
for not reducing the number of nuclear weapons or at
least Russia’s reliance on them. 4
This conclusion obviously contradicts the rather
rosy expectations of many U.S. analysts that the great
powers can safely and unilaterally reduce nuclear
weapons without experiencing any adverse consequences.
This conclusion might well cause dismay
among advocates of global zero. But Russian writing,
obviously not without its own shortcomings, remains
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