- Page 1 and 2:
Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Pres
- Page 3 and 4:
***** Comments pertaining to this r
- Page 5 and 6:
Part III 6. Caught between Scylla a
- Page 8 and 9:
INTRODUCTION As of November 2010, t
- Page 10 and 11:
future reductions to a 1,000 warhea
- Page 12 and 13:
CHAPTER 1 RUSSIAN NUCLEAR AND CONVE
- Page 14 and 15:
States (CIS). For a number of reaso
- Page 16 and 17:
with nuclear weapons alone. General
- Page 18 and 19:
cratic politics that Kvashnin revel
- Page 20 and 21:
PUTIN AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF
- Page 22 and 23:
sequences flowing therefrom.” 22
- Page 24 and 25:
its rightful conclusion.” 29 In t
- Page 26 and 27:
The words about the priority of nuc
- Page 28 and 29:
If the constant failures by the Bul
- Page 30 and 31:
LONG-RANGE AVIATION Using the one o
- Page 32 and 33:
prepare themselves against.” 51 A
- Page 34 and 35:
that day the directorates were enga
- Page 36 and 37:
USING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES TO O
- Page 38 and 39:
2. Vladimir Dvorkin, “Russia’s
- Page 40 and 41:
28. “Hope Glimmers for Reform,”
- Page 42:
53. “The Military Doctrine of the
- Page 45 and 46:
mittee, and Viktor Ozerov, the Head
- Page 47 and 48:
1,107 as of September 1, 2008, to 8
- Page 49 and 50:
Implementation. Chief of the Genera
- Page 51 and 52:
has not been followed by any obviou
- Page 53 and 54:
ficers compared with society and th
- Page 55 and 56:
Many of these challenges are unlike
- Page 57 and 58:
Institute, examined some of these i
- Page 59 and 60:
of brigades in the table of organiz
- Page 61 and 62:
The performance of the brigades, fo
- Page 63 and 64:
employment will be effective when t
- Page 65 and 66:
RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE 2010: “
- Page 67 and 68:
The Search for the “New:” Defin
- Page 69 and 70:
on states; individual states violat
- Page 71 and 72:
almost verbatim. The third threat,
- Page 73 and 74:
ministry working group. Army-Genera
- Page 75 and 76:
Nuclear Posture and Redrafting. Des
- Page 77 and 78:
Medvedev. 67 Although much of the d
- Page 79 and 80:
identifying the intentions and fore
- Page 81 and 82:
The Russian Federation reserves the
- Page 83 and 84:
the Chinese. Moreover, they do not
- Page 85 and 86:
United States, Russia is in a diffe
- Page 87 and 88:
mankind to the brink of a nuclear c
- Page 89 and 90:
Tactical Nuclear Reduction Talks as
- Page 91 and 92:
as among Alliance members, future B
- Page 93 and 94:
in Krasnaya Zvezda. Their proposal
- Page 95 and 96:
fearing that, unless handled sensit
- Page 97 and 98:
of strategic engagement with Russia
- Page 99 and 100:
6. Baranets, “The Army Will Be Ge
- Page 101 and 102:
28. “Putin Chairs Meeting in Voro
- Page 103 and 104:
44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Voyennaya D
- Page 105 and 106:
Visits Abu Dhabi Arms Show, Talks o
- Page 107 and 108:
Nuclear Development Concerns Russia
- Page 110 and 111:
CHAPTER 3 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA
- Page 112 and 113:
tary and foreign policy, many polit
- Page 114 and 115:
In June 1967, U.S. President Lyndon
- Page 116 and 117:
1970s had long-term effects on late
- Page 118 and 119:
ons aimed at satellites. 17 Clearly
- Page 120 and 121:
educing strategic armaments and eve
- Page 122 and 123:
Internationally, the RF earned a du
- Page 124 and 125:
itary-political relations with West
- Page 126 and 127:
The situation in the armed forces t
- Page 128 and 129:
The Russian Federation reserves the
- Page 130 and 131:
In the latter case, they expected o
- Page 132 and 133:
As seen by a Russian expert: In mid
- Page 134 and 135:
facilitate the elimination of weapo
- Page 136 and 137:
Putin saw added opportunities for p
- Page 138 and 139:
the expanded uses of nuclear weapon
- Page 140 and 141:
sures” to counter the U.S. BMD an
- Page 142 and 143:
and NATO provocations.” In partic
- Page 144 and 145:
econsider its key postulates. Alrea
- Page 146 and 147:
CONCLUSION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITI
- Page 148 and 149:
eady developing the theory of strat
- Page 150 and 151:
termination of the Cold War and the
- Page 152 and 153:
goals and the promise “to extend
- Page 154 and 155:
• Reforms of the army, law-enforc
- Page 156 and 157:
5. Andrei A. Gromyko, “To Be Reme
- Page 158 and 159:
29. “Yeltsin Rattles Nuclear Sabr
- Page 160 and 161:
45. Vladimir Putin, “Opening Addr
- Page 162 and 163:
62. See Amy F. Woolf, “Anti-Balli
- Page 164 and 165:
71. “Sergei Ivanov: Russia is for
- Page 166 and 167:
90. Vladimir Ivanov, “Iskanders A
- Page 168 and 169:
lish%2FDefence_Arms_13%2FRussia_s_D
- Page 170:
125. See Keith B. Payne, “Disarma
- Page 173 and 174:
The positive shift in relations coi
- Page 175 and 176:
and in other public statements that
- Page 177 and 178:
tagonist of the cause for dismantli
- Page 179 and 180:
mobilization. 11 It is possible to
- Page 181 and 182:
Since the collapse of the Union of
- Page 183 and 184:
avoid the need to act on this rheto
- Page 185 and 186:
the technology behind its modern ai
- Page 187 and 188:
duumvirate might be modified or aba
- Page 189 and 190:
to be non-negotiable. Putin believe
- Page 191 and 192:
Such a hard-driven Russia might tur
- Page 193 and 194:
10. A more detailed analysis of thi
- Page 195 and 196:
analysis can be found in Aleksei Ar
- Page 198 and 199:
CHAPTER 5 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN RUSSIA
- Page 200 and 201:
ery vehicles is apparently below th
- Page 202 and 203:
out as to whether it will be able t
- Page 204 and 205:
that they could theoretically affec
- Page 206 and 207:
cause Russia can respond with nucle
- Page 208 and 209:
states, and Nordic countries to tha
- Page 210 and 211:
should be more properly translated
- Page 212 and 213:
as reduced-noise submarines. In pos
- Page 214 and 215:
cautious attitude toward missile de
- Page 216 and 217:
few years later, demonstrated that
- Page 218 and 219:
exercises since 1999. All of them w
- Page 220 and 221:
2010 AND INTO THE FUTURE The new, t
- Page 222 and 223:
fewer paragraphs about the use of n
- Page 224 and 225:
Force, whose leaders rarely if ever
- Page 226 and 227:
and verifiable treaty on TNW was at
- Page 228 and 229:
ity is regarded as an advantage tha
- Page 230 and 231:
tiatives aimed at reducing the Russ
- Page 232 and 233:
The pace and the success rate for e
- Page 234 and 235:
Even more remote is the plan to dev
- Page 236 and 237:
construction of the first submarine
- Page 238 and 239:
tion of that leg was still minimal.
- Page 240 and 241:
where between Tu-22M3 and heavy bom
- Page 242 and 243:
weapons guarantee Russia’s securi
- Page 244 and 245:
of information about plans turned o
- Page 246 and 247:
Quite paradoxically, another, equal
- Page 248 and 249:
troversy over missile defense. In h
- Page 250 and 251:
A positive element in all the confl
- Page 252 and 253: from submarines is likely to compli
- Page 254 and 255: 2005, two more are close to complet
- Page 256 and 257: time) is practically never mentione
- Page 258 and 259: from Alaska, “but they will not b
- Page 260 and 261: porting of an even more expensive p
- Page 262 and 263: 5. Roman Dobrokhotov, “Obezoruzhi
- Page 264 and 265: 20. A. Khryapin and V. Afanasiev,
- Page 266 and 267: (“The God of War Does Not Retire
- Page 268 and 269: 50. For a recent statement to that
- Page 270 and 271: closely fit one of first strike sce
- Page 272 and 273: CHAPTER 6 CAUGHT BETWEEN SCYLLA AND
- Page 274 and 275: completely out of proportion to its
- Page 276 and 277: its conventional military force to
- Page 278 and 279: especially in the strategic nuclear
- Page 280 and 281: in the NSS and brings it close to h
- Page 282 and 283: wars. However, given expressions of
- Page 284 and 285: equate command and control capabili
- Page 286 and 287: weapons. The number of commands and
- Page 288 and 289: upgraded warplanes, 20 to 25 milita
- Page 290 and 291: the fact that the economy and infra
- Page 292 and 293: The threat environment fabricated b
- Page 294 and 295: There are aspects to their nuclear
- Page 296 and 297: that are likely to result in greate
- Page 298 and 299: ope. Recently, Moscow even objected
- Page 300 and 301: 8. Ibid, p. 6. 9. “Russia to broa
- Page 304 and 305: CHAPTER 7 RUSSIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPON
- Page 306 and 307: centered on the real possibility of
- Page 308 and 309: conventional wars. The public debat
- Page 310 and 311: have been a much more robust high-t
- Page 312 and 313: Even though defense spending has be
- Page 314 and 315: Medvedev announced in May 2010 subs
- Page 316 and 317: NATO/U.S. and Chinese air and other
- Page 318 and 319: assert Russia’s identity as a gre
- Page 320 and 321: Russian political system which cann
- Page 322 and 323: leaders like Lieutenant General Yev
- Page 324 and 325: to maintain parity are now being in
- Page 326 and 327: tially hostile forces in both the e
- Page 328 and 329: Security Advisor James L. Jones,
- Page 330 and 331: fenses once this treaty is ratified
- Page 332 and 333: that having created an umbrella aga
- Page 334 and 335: Army (PLA). 97 Similarly, proof of
- Page 336 and 337: interference. In political terms, i
- Page 338 and 339: Russia to apply them in order to ma
- Page 340 and 341: The asymmetric escalation posture i
- Page 342 and 343: Finally, we must understand that Ru
- Page 344 and 345: this Russian statement essentially
- Page 346 and 347: consequences of the Democratic Peop
- Page 348 and 349: ate a real strategic partnership th
- Page 350 and 351: Neither are Russian military analys
- Page 352 and 353:
consequences of NATO enlargement, t
- Page 354 and 355:
Russia’s reaction to Asian milita
- Page 356 and 357:
Russian commentators noted that he
- Page 358 and 359:
CONCLUSIONS Nuclear weapons issues
- Page 360 and 361:
4. Military Doctrine of the Russian
- Page 362 and 363:
2008, pp. 97-128; Stanislav Secrier
- Page 364 and 365:
48. Colin Gray, House of Cards, Ith
- Page 366 and 367:
69. Transcript of Remarks and Respo
- Page 368 and 369:
87. “Interview with Foreign Minis
- Page 370 and 371:
110. “Russia RVSN Military Academ
- Page 372 and 373:
133. Jonathan Pollack, “U.S. Stra
- Page 374 and 375:
Taiwan Strait and the Future of Chi
- Page 376 and 377:
CHAPTER 8 RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR
- Page 378 and 379:
ased Intercontinental Ballistic Mis
- Page 380 and 381:
also not well enforced. The Nuclear
- Page 382 and 383:
The Soviet and Russian Armed Forces
- Page 384 and 385:
nuclear expert Alexei Arbatov confi
- Page 386 and 387:
• large-scale conflicts such as W
- Page 388 and 389:
preemptive strike, is not ruled out
- Page 390 and 391:
Asia, Russian leaders see resorting
- Page 392 and 393:
In response, Russian leaders threat
- Page 394 and 395:
any such intent. In July 2010, Alek
- Page 396 and 397:
tional conflict that Russia risked
- Page 398 and 399:
etween signaling Moscow’s serious
- Page 400 and 401:
to bring to reason anyone who could
- Page 402 and 403:
than the existing PNIs, which lack
- Page 404 and 405:
taken place or are in the process o
- Page 406 and 407:
in the next round of U.S.-Russian a
- Page 408 and 409:
and Britain characterize their nucl
- Page 410 and 411:
e dealt with as part of the NATO-Ru
- Page 412 and 413:
CONCLUSION: NUCLEAR POSSIBILITIES A
- Page 414 and 415:
a majority of Russian respondents (
- Page 416 and 417:
7. Sergei Zhuravlev, “On Combat R
- Page 418 and 419:
23. See for example: “The Nationa
- Page 420 and 421:
available from www.nytimes.com/2008
- Page 422 and 423:
Ogaryovo, June 9, 2006, President o
- Page 424 and 425:
72. “Russia Warns U.S. about Weap
- Page 426:
news%5D=34834&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5
- Page 429 and 430:
currency. Russian-American strategi
- Page 431 and 432:
The U.S. will continue to deploy an
- Page 433 and 434:
noted that U.S. policy was generall
- Page 435 and 436:
to create a conventional-nuclear fi
- Page 437 and 438:
achieve transformative goals in the
- Page 439 and 440:
West is taking place within a large
- Page 441 and 442:
U.S nuclear weapons during the Cold
- Page 443 and 444:
States to repatriate or destroy all
- Page 445 and 446:
In doing so, the leaders of Russia
- Page 447 and 448:
to reducing the numbers of deployed
- Page 449 and 450:
United States July 2009 Old START l
- Page 451 and 452:
(4) forces are on day to day alert
- Page 453 and 454:
1,000 instead of 1,550? In Figures
- Page 455 and 456:
possible concert with sympathetic K
- Page 457 and 458:
The findings in Figure 9-6 show tha
- Page 459 and 460:
the problem, from a Russian perspec
- Page 461 and 462:
6. Robert M. Gates, “The Case for
- Page 463 and 464:
14. Daryl G. Kimball, “Obama’s
- Page 465 and 466:
27. According to some experts, Russ
- Page 467 and 468:
44. See George Perkovich, “After
- Page 469 and 470:
56. An argument in favor of a multi
- Page 471 and 472:
multipolar context and speaks of Ru
- Page 473 and 474:
For well over 2 decades, Soviet and
- Page 475 and 476:
strikes seemed to have been designe
- Page 477 and 478:
als, since combat potential, when n
- Page 479 and 480:
The gamble on the nature of future
- Page 481 and 482:
FACING WEST AND EAST For Russia, wh
- Page 483 and 484:
tional system had shifted to a unip
- Page 485 and 486:
cal Islamic elements there and acro
- Page 487 and 488:
gic mobility and underscored the ne
- Page 489 and 490:
the transportation infrastructure t
- Page 491 and 492:
tion of China as a strategic threat
- Page 493 and 494:
concerns have become greater as the
- Page 495 and 496:
eforms of the Russian military, off
- Page 497 and 498:
ing tasks with small subunits. We h
- Page 499 and 500:
American superpower. In 2002, Nikon
- Page 501 and 502:
nario had left open the interventio
- Page 503 and 504:
der Guards, speak of Chinese effort
- Page 505 and 506:
military. In the absence of such a
- Page 507 and 508:
formed conventional forces might ac
- Page 509 and 510:
15. On the facilities in these two
- Page 511 and 512:
Daalder, The CFE Treaty: An Overvie
- Page 513 and 514:
57. “Vostok-2010 bez konkretnykh
- Page 516 and 517:
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS STEPHEN J. B
- Page 518 and 519:
the U.S. Government as the director
- Page 520 and 521:
seminal chapter in a forthcoming bo
- Page 522 and 523:
Eurasia (2008); Mismanaging Mayhem:
- Page 524 and 525:
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE This Publicat