Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

ope. Recently, Moscow even objected to the deployment
of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland.
Russia has a two-fold problem with the U.S. pursuit
of effective theater defenses. The first is the impact
defenses may have on their efforts to deploy superior
theater capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.
The second is their belief that theater defenses, particularly
if “Internetted” and connected to space-based
and other mobile sensors, will be a dandy platform for
creation of a highly effective strategic defense capability.
Such a defense, employed in conjunction with an
advanced, precision conventional offense, could provide
the basis for a disarming first-strike scenario.
Missile defenses, particularly those in Europe, appear
to strike at the very heart of the Russian concept
of strategic stability and Moscow’s requirement to be
able to hold Europe at risk regardless of the balance of
forces between Russia and the United States. One analyst
sought to answer the question why a defense of
only 10 interceptors oriented towards the threat from
Iran would so antagonize the Russian government.
Close examination of Russian policy reveals that
these defenses entrench the United States in Eastern
Europe’s military defense and foreclose Russia’s hope
of intimidating Central and Eastern Europe or of reestablishing
its hegemony there and possibly even in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). If missile
defenses exist in Europe, Russian missile threats are
greatly diminished, if not negated. Because empire
and the creation of a fearsome domestic enemy justify
and are the inextricable corollaries of internal autocracy,
the end of empire allegedly entails Russia’s irrevocable
decline as a great power and – the crucial
point – generates tremendous pressure for domestic
reform. 38
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