Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

military’s conventional capabilities. Russia lacks the
technological base or the financial resources for such
an arms race. It is extremely unlikely that the Russian
military will receive the quantities of new and upgraded
platforms and systems it desires. But even if a
miracle were to occur, the Russian military would still
continue to fall behind the West (and China) which,
as Russian threat statements underscore, are investing
heavily in a wide range of military technologies
including advanced command, control, and communications
(C3); information warfare; unmanned systems;
hypervelocity platforms; and directed energy
weapons.
This led Russia to examine the possibility asymmetric
responses. Then President Vladimir Putin described
such an approach in 2006.
We are to keep our eyes open on the plans and development
trends of other countries’ armed forces, and
to know about their future developments. Quantity
is not the end, however. . . . Our responses are to be
based on intellectual superiority. They will be asymmetrical,
and less costly. 26
What form might such an asymmetric response
take? One Russian author suggests that this would involve
horizontal escalation against strategic targets in
the enemy’s territory.
Combining defensive operations undertaken to beat
off aggression and asymmetrical actions relying on the
efficiency of modern high-precision conventionally
equipped strategic weapons systems, supported by
subversive and reconnaissance groups is a persuasive
enough factor for the enemy to cease military operations
on terms favorable for Russia. This conclusion
has a practical significance and relevance in view of
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