Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

42. The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) has traditionally
calculated both the overall number (2,050) and categories
of Russian TNW by counting nuclear-capable delivery vehicles.
Unlike strategic weapons, however, the relationship between
delivery vehicles and warheads is far from direct where TNW are
concerned—it is far from obvious that Russia keeps nuclear warheads
for all nuclear-capable delivery vehicles (meaning that the
stockpile number is lower than the number of delivery vehicles)
or, alternatively, might have several warheads for each delivery
vehicle.
43. It is ironic that confidential interviews collected in 1991-92
among U.S. officials attributed the rejection by George H. W. Bush
of the Russian proposal to start negotiations on a legally binding
and verifiable treaty on TNW to the U.S. Navy, which was
reluctant to allow on-site inspections of ships and submarines to
confirm the absence of nuclear warheads.
44. For details, see Nikolai Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization:
Past and Future, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000,
chap. 1.
45. “Pochti Vse Puskovye Ustanovki RVSN Nakhodyatsya v
Miutnoi Gotovnosti,” RIA-Novosti, February 11, 2009.
46. “Vtoroi Polk Mobilnykh ‘Topol-M’ Zastupit na Dezhurstvo
do Kontsa Goda,” RIA-Novosti, November 18, 2009.
47. It is widely assumed that 30 Topol-Ms a year would be the
cost-effective level of production—the lowest cost per unit—and
has been regularly mentioned by leading figures of the Russian
military-industrial complex.
48. “Rossiya ne Budet Narashchivat Proizvodstvo Raket v
Ushshcherb Sotsialnym Programmam” (“Russia Will Not Increase
Production of Missiles at the Expense of Social Programs”),
RIA-Novosti, December 7, 2007.
49. “Pervyi Vitse-Premier Sergey Ivanov Zayavil o Neobkhodimosti
Pariteta Yadernyih Sil Rossii i SShA” (“First Vice-
Premier Sergey Ivanov Declared that Parity of Russian and U.S.
Nuclear Forces is Needed”), RIA-Novosti, December 7, 2007.
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