Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

(“The God of War Does Not Retire”), Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier,
November 19-25, 2003. In subsequent publications, Zaritski
did not mention tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) at all or alluded
to some nuclear role for the Ground Forces in a general, nonspecific
way without identifying missions or assets and referring
to earlier late 1990s military manuals or doctrines. See Vladimir
Zaritski, “O Razrabotke Novoi Metodiki Planirovania Ognevogo
Porazheniya Protivnika v Operatsii i Bouyu” (“Toward Developing
New Methods for Planning of Use of Firepower Against Adversary
in an Operation and a Close Fighting”), Voyennaya Mysl,
No. 12, 2006; “Napravleniya Sovershenstvovaniya Form i Sposobov
Boevogo Primeneniya RViA v Obshchevoiskovoi Operatsii
(Bouyu)” (“Ways to Enhance the Ways and Means of Combat
Use of Rocket Forces and Artillery in an Operation (Close Combat)
of General Purpose Forces”) Voyennaya Mysl No. 11, 2006; V.
Zaritski, L.Kharkevich, Obshchaya,Taktika (Foundations of Tactics),
Tambov, Rusia, 2007. Information supplied by the Chief of the
12th GUMO, the Defense Ministry agency directly responsible for
handling of all nuclear weapons, should probably be regarded as
more authoritative. The statements by Zaritski could also signify
that nuclear weapons are still regarded by a significant sector of
the Russian military as desirable both in terms of mission support
and status. His attitude seems to be in line with the insistence of
Russian Navy officials that they need nuclear weapons to support
some of their missions. Although the value of Zaritski’s assertion
as direct evidence with regard to the status of sub-strategic weapons
in Russia should probably be questioned, it certainly testifies
to the “nuclear romanticism” of many Russian military leaders.
40. There is no good way to calculate the numbers—the 2,000
figure is most often cited by Western and Russian nongovernmental
experts and is often privately confirmed by Russian officials.
If, however, one takes as a baseline the number provided
by Alexei Arbatov for 1991—21,700 (Alexei Arbatov, “Deep Cuts
and de-Alerting: A Russian Perspective,” in The Nuclear Turning
Point, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p.
320), then the 75 percent reduction officially announced by Russia
would leave it with 5,400 warheads by 2004—a figure that should
be lower as dismantlement continues.
41. Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2009, available from thebulletin.metapress.com/content/h304370t70137734/fulltext.pdf.
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