Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

anks of retired generals who claimed that the United
States could use the abrogation of the INF Treaty once
again to deploy Pershing II and ground launched
cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe; clearly, uniformed
military, who are less wedded to Cold War concepts,
did not regard that as a likely scenario.
The outcome of the debates that raged in 2005-07
reminded NATO’s 1979 “dual-track” decision (it is
noteworthy how much contemporary Russian policies
are influenced by examples set by past policies
of NATO)—Russia would not withdraw from the INF
Treaty, but would propose to make it a multilateral
agreement. It was tacitly assumed that abrogation was
not off the agenda, however, and the issue could be
revisited if countries with intermediate-range missile
programs do not join. The United States joined the initiative
and in 2008 Moscow even tabled a draft multilateral
INF Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament
in Geneva. Thus the issue has remained on the agenda,
and from time to time Moscow reminds other countries
about the proposal. The specter of withdrawal
from the INF Treaty has not disappeared completely,
but is mentioned very rarely. It is possible that it could
eventually die out quietly, but a new international crisis
(for example, between Russia and Iran) could reignite
it once again.
An important variable in any future decisions
with regard to the withdrawal from the INF Treaty is
funding. While resumption of production of SS-20s or
extending the range of Iskander tactical missiles are
technologically feasible, the Russian government has
consistently limited funding for production of even
existing classes of weapons—ICBMs and short-range
missiles. It does not appear likely that it will be sup-
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