Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

from Alaska, “but they will not be deployed there.”
Referring specifically to North Korea, he stated that,
for Russia, intermediate-range missiles would be far
more useful as conventionally armed systems than
intercontinental missiles, as proposed by the United
States. 80
Ultimately, however, the rationale for withdrawal
from the INF Treaty changed and came to be linked
to George W. Bush administration’s plans for missile
defense in Europe. Early in 2007, Chief of the General
Staff Yuri Baluevski declared that Russia was considering
whether to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and
the final decision was contingent upon U.S. actions
with regard to deployment of a missile defense system
in proximity to Russia. 81
The leading role in the push for withdrawal was
often attributed to the SRF, which sought to expand
its force and give it more relevance within the military
establishment. It is noteworthy that Director of
the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of
Defense (the institute conducts research to support
the SRF) Major-General Vladimir Vasilenko, in a departure
from the standard Russian perspective, said
that intercontinental strategic missiles were preferable
to intermediate-range systems as conventional assets
because the longer range of the former made them a
more versatile asset. 82 The Air Force was a more vocal
voice of opposition—its representatives declared
that they could support any conventional or nuclear
mission at the theater level implying that there was
no reason to spend all the political and financial resources
to deploy intermediate-range land-based missiles.
The Foreign Ministry was another force opposing
the abrogation of an important treaty. There was
also quite serious—and surprising—opposition in the
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