Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

time) is practically never mentioned—the emphasis
is almost always on the numbers of weapons subject
to elimination. Particularly painful for the military is
the agreement by Mikhail Gorbachev to include SS-23
Oka missiles into the treaty: the range of that missile is
widely believed (not without reason) to be below 500
km and thus it should not have been subject to the INF
Treaty, or so many still believe. In other words, the
INF Treaty is often regarded as a symbol of betrayal
and unwarranted concessions. This perception has
strongly affected many other arms control issues, including
Russian resistance to Western proposals with
regard to reduction of nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the INF Treaty was not only implemented,
but Russia continues to uphold it. Until relatively
recently, there was no reason to believe that
constant grumbling would translate into proposals to
abrogate it. Such proposals did emerge, however, in
the middle of 2000s.
When the United States withdrew from the ABM
Treaty in 2002, many in Russia regarded this as an example
that could be emulated—namely, that it is acceptable
to withdraw from treaties once they are no
longer regarded as serving national interest. U.S. withdrawal
from the ABM Treaty certainly undermined
the argument about sanctity of international agreements,
especially among the Russian military. Central
to the argument about abrogation of the INF was its
bilateral nature: “others have ‘em.” Official statements
did not point at specific countries, but public debates
mentioned China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran,
and Israel.
An important point to bear in mind is that proposals
for withdrawal from the INF Treaty were not
part of a desire to enhance nuclear capability. Instead,
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