Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

of information about plans turned out to be insufficient.
It is no wonder that the lowest point in U.S.-Russian
interaction on missile defense was the end of
2007 and 2008. In October 2007, a two-by-two meeting
(between foreign and defense ministers of the two
countries) seemed to have achieved a preliminary
agreement on a set of confidence building measures
intended to alleviate Russian concerns. Neither side
was fully satisfied with it, but about a week after that
meeting Vladimir Putin (at that time still president of
Russia) indicated that Moscow regarded that tentative
deal as a foundation for possible future agreement. 64
When the United States transmitted its proposals on
missile defense in writing a month later (delay was
ascribed to protracted bureaucratic in-fighting in
Washington), however, Russian officials promptly
rejected them, accusing the United States of retracting
the compromises discussed during the Gates-Rice
visit and returning the negotiations to square one. 65
After that, Moscow came to regard dialogue with the
United States on missile defense as impossible.
Against that background, the September 2009 announcement
about a revision of plans for defense of
Europe was seen as positive news. While principled
opposition to missile defense did not disappear, the
new architecture was at least logically explainable. It
was clearly intended to defend Europe from existing
Iranian missiles and at the same time in the near future
will not have capability to intercept Russian ICBMs.
Acknowledgment by the United States in the New
START treaty of a relationship between offensive and
defensive weapons also contributed to a calmer tone
of interaction on missile defense. New START did not
resolve the issue from the Russian perspective but was
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