Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

service time is regularly extended, this cannot continue
indefinitely. The rate of replacement is low and
new ballistic missiles, both land- and sea-based, carry
fewer warheads than Soviet ones. This means that the
arsenal undergoes gradual reduction. The strategic arsenal
will probably stabilize by the end of this decade
at about 800-1,200 warheads.
It is hardly surprising that Russia chose to deploy a
new generation of delivery vehicles instead of restarting
production of existing types. Behind this decision
is the Soviet tradition of uninterrupted modernization,
which, in turn, was determined by the structure of the
Soviet design and production complex. 44 It should
be noted, however, that the majority of new types of
strategic weapons were still developed in the Soviet
Union.
Technologically and conceptually, current strategic
modernization programs represent linear continuation
of Soviet programs. In this sense, the emerging
Russian strategic nuclear posture is very traditional.
SRF will probably account for the bulk of all deployed
warheads (around 50-60 percent). The earlier plans to
radically change the structure of the triad and shift the
emphasis to the Navy, which were developed in 2000
and approved by then-President Vladimir Putin, have
been abandoned. Russia has continued the Soviet line
toward reduction of vulnerability and maintenance
of high degree of readiness for launch—according to
the SRF, almost all ICBMs could be launched within 1
minute. 45
The air-based leg of the triad is gradually shifting
to a new tangent, however—to conventional strike capability.
Eventually its role in the triad will probably
be primarily symbolic, and for all intents and purposes
the Russian strategic arsenal will become a dyad.
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