Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

portant player, has many other more pressing
items on its agenda. Since no parochial group
is seriously interested in changing the existing
position, the Navy’s interest wins by default.
• Arms Control Challenges. Russian ambivalence
with regard to TNW might also reflect the
challenges of crafting a verifiable treaty. The
traditional approach, according to which nuclear
weapons are accounted for and reduced
indirectly through accounting and reduction
of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, is inapplicable
to TNW. New accounting rules require
much more intrusive verification at several
categories of nuclear-related facilities that have
never been subject to inspections—storage sites
for nuclear weapons, dismantlement facilities,
etc. While such procedures are, in principle, not
unthinkable, it would take serious investment
of political resources to overcome entrenched
resistance and political opposition.
Russia’s response to all Western proposals has
remained the same for years—any discussion is only
possible after the United States withdraws its TNW
from Europe. An interesting aspect of that condition
is that Moscow apparently does not have a plan as to
what it might do if the United States, indeed, complies
with it. One can find a range of rather contradictory
opinions on how Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons
(NSNW) could be leveraged, but these come from
any quarter except from high-level officials. By all indications,
the sole purpose of the current Russian position
is to deflect U.S. and European pressure.
While American TNW in Europe are few, they provide
a convenient justification for rejection of any ini-
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