Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

ity is regarded as an advantage that could be
traded for something tangible and should not
be given away. Western attempts to persuade
Russia to act on TNW (which by default means
asymmetric reductions) tend to be regarded
with suspicion without serious thought about
the reasons for these proposals. Instead, such
attempts are seen as proof that these weapons
are truly valuable.
• Inertia. The longer the same position is maintained,
the more entrenched it becomes. A position
that has been in place for over a decade can
be changed either when the leadership changes
(as happened when Gorbachev assumed the
highest office in the Soviet Union) or when the
external environment changes. Neither condition
is present today.
• “Capabilities-Based Planning.” The Russian elite,
including the military leadership, acutely feels
the uncertainty of the international environment.
The main threat is still associated with
the United States and its allies, but other potential
threats are emerging and the Russian
military is reluctant to part with any assets. In
2005-07, similar arguments were made in favor
of the withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
• Parochial Group Politics. As noted above, the
Navy is interested in keeping TNW as a “justin-case”
option. 43 In contrast, the Air Force
appears much less interested in TNW except
for weapons assigned to Tu-22M3 medium
bombers. Other groups probably have even
less interest in TNW, but are unlikely to invest
political resources to get rid of these weapons.
Similarly, the Foreign Ministry, another im-
217