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Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

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it. It is commonly believed that Russia has about 2,000<br />

warheads for delivery vehicles that are not subject to<br />

START treaties—about double what the United States<br />

is assumed to have. 40 Breaking down that uncertain<br />

number into categories is even more challenging. According<br />

to the Natural Resources Defense Council<br />

(NRDC), the Air Force has 650 warheads, the Navy<br />

700, <strong>and</strong> Air Defense <strong>and</strong> Missile Defense (nowadays<br />

united in the Aerospace Forces) 700. 41 <strong>Russian</strong> nongovernmental<br />

experts use the same figures, but the<br />

method of calculation used by NRDC leaves many<br />

uncertainties. 42<br />

It is safe to assume that the overall size of the<br />

stockpile is going down. Russia continued to dismantle<br />

warheads with expired service life (warranty), <strong>and</strong><br />

only some of those are refurbished. The rate of dismantlement<br />

<strong>and</strong> refurbishment is limited by the available<br />

industrial capacity. There is no saying at what<br />

point the decline will stop <strong>and</strong> the stockpile become<br />

stabilized. That time is probably near.<br />

A solution to the paradox of TNW—assets that<br />

Russia apparently does not need, but continues to<br />

hold on to—can be found in domestic politics rather<br />

than in strategic planning. The <strong>Russian</strong> government<br />

attitude toward TNW appears to represent a complex<br />

mix of domestic <strong>and</strong> bureaucratic politics, (mis)perceptions,<br />

<strong>and</strong> idiosyncrasies. Its main elements could<br />

be summarized in the following way:<br />

• “No More Unreciprocated Concessions.” Resistance<br />

to arms control measures with regard to<br />

TNW appears to reflect the deep-seated rejection<br />

of Gorbachev <strong>and</strong> early Yeltsin propensity<br />

to make wide-ranging concessions that Edward<br />

Shevardnadze used to call “concessions to<br />

common sense.” <strong>Russian</strong> numerical superior-<br />

216

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