Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future

under which these weapons could be used. Specifically,
whereas the 2000 Doctrine foresaw the resorting
to nuclear weapons “in situations critical for [the]
national security” of Russia, the 2010 version allows
for their use in situations when “the very existence of
[Russia] is under threat.” 26 At least in this regard, the
new Doctrine returned to the principles of the 1993
and 1997 strategies.
Otherwise, the new document seemed to closely
follow the line set in 2000. The role of nuclear weapons,
according to the new Doctrine, is “prevention of
nuclear military conflict or any other military conflict.”
They are regarded as “an important factor in the prevention
of nuclear conflicts and military conflicts that use
conventional assets (large-scale and regional wars).”
The new document also clearly indicates that a conventional
regional war could escalate to the nuclear
level. In a slight change from 2000, the latter provision
is formulated in broader terms—this is now not only
seen as a means of deterring or dissuading states that
might attack Russia with conventional armed forces,
but also an expression of concern that similar escalation
might take place elsewhere. 27 That is, that the mission
of de-escalation remains on the books. The new
Doctrine mandates the maintenance of nuclear capability
“at the level of sufficiency,” which means ability
to inflict calibrated damage, same as the previous
guidance. An interesting feature of the 2010 Doctrine
is the emphasis on strategic deterrence capability. The
choice of terms seems to indicate that Russia does not
assign a visible role to substrategic (or tactical) nuclear
weapons.
Overall, the 2010 Doctrine devotes less attention
to the nuclear component of Armed Forces than the
previous one. At the most superficial level, there are
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